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Impact Investing as a Form of  Lobbying 
and Its Corporate-Governance Effects
Andrzej Rapaczynski
Abstract
Impact investment is attractive to many because it seems to combine support for progres-
sive causes with an apparent commitment to the principles of  a market economy. In fact, 
however, a rational impact investor is not simply creating demand for certain types of  cor-
porate actions; he/she is attempting to use corporate governance mechanisms to influence 
fiduciary decisions of  the management. The cost of  this tactic for the health of  the capital-
ist economy is potentially very considerable. The American capitalist system relies heavily 
on a relatively fragile corporate governance arrangement in which the agency problems of  
a modern corporation are minimized by making shareholder value into the ultimate objec-
tive of  the management. A crucial assumption in this model is that shareholders are a ho-
mogenous group interested in the maximization of  financial returns, which makes market 
price into a reliable criterion of  corporate performance. The injection of  a more complex 
corporate objective function – an inevitable consequence of  impact investment – raises the 
potentially insoluble problem of  aggregating the diverse interests of  the shareholders and 
seriously weakens the ability of  the shareholders to monitor management performance.
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Impact investing is an ambiguous idea that may mean different things to different people. So 
let me begin with a few words of  clarification and an attempt to specify the particular aspect 
of  impact investing that I would like to address.
There is a certain immediate attractiveness associated with the very idea of  impact 
investing. The objectives of  many impact investors are in some ways similar to those of  
many critics of  capitalist market societies: both groups want to contribute to the protection 
of  the environment, support clean technologies and sustainable agriculture, help provide 
housing, education, and medical assistance to the poor, improve the treatment of  workers 
or other underprivileged groups around the world, and generally enhance the values that the 
market otherwise does not seem to provide in sufficient quantities by itself. But unlike anti-
capitalist political activism, which is based on the beliefs that markets are inherently flawed 
and that the values endangered by the capitalist economy should be achieved by political 
compulsion, impact investing looks like a classic affirmation of  the market: by putting his 
money where his mouth is, an impact investor may be seen as creating demand for socially 
beneficial corporate actions, and the essence of  capitalism is to satisfy such spending-backed 
demand.
In fact, however, impact investing is nothing of  the sort. There are, of  course, many 
kinds of  people engaging in something like impact investing, and not all of  them are of  in-
terest here. Some impact investors may be firm supporters of  market capitalism and simply 
not know how it functions, or they may be acting under various illusions about how their 
actions will do good at no extra cost. Others may just feel good by giving essentially chari-
table support for socially conscious corporate action and believe that the social cost of  such 
actions, if  any, will be covered by their own lower returns. Still others, such as foundations 
or universities, are investing institutional money under pressure from their non-investment 
constituencies, such as students, professors, and others who are expressing their ideologi-
cal preferences, because the legitimacy of  the leaders of  those institutions depends more 
on the opinions of  their internal constituencies than on actual investment returns. Finally, 
some impact investors might be financial intermediaries that use the social appeal of  impact 
investment to attract capital to their funds, either trying to persuade the investors that they 
can indulge in their ideological preferences without sacrificing their financial returns or leav-
ing the issue hazy enough to allow for the same illusion.
What interests me here is what a rational investor, who is not a philanthropist, might 
be trying to accomplish by impact investment, rather than what a deluded or misguided 
social activist may imagine he is doing. I want to inquire into what such a rational impact 
investor can in fact realistically hope to accomplish, the conditions under which he may 
succeed in advancing the social objectives he pursues, and what may be the real social cost 
of  his activities, especially in terms of  the functioning of  the economic system. At bottom, 
then, I want to examine whether impact investing can be seen as compatible with the basic 
framework of  a capitalist market society.
The differentia specifica of  impact investment, as I understand it here, is the acceptance 
of  non-financial standards as an integral component of  measuring corporate performance. I 
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don’t mean, of  course, that an impact investor ignores financial returns. What is important is 
that she does not see social impact as something that will simply improve financial returns in 
the end. Indeed, an investor who buys the shares of  a company that pursues a certain social 
policy, be it otherwise desirable or not, because she believes that it will at some point increase 
her financial return, is in fact just an investor tout court, and not an “impact” investor at all. 
The special feature of  an impact investor is that she sees the social impact as an independent 
factor in evaluating corporate performance, to be weighed together with financial returns, even 
if  as a result the standard financial return on investment ultimately ends up smaller than it 
would otherwise have been.
This definition of  impact investing is not by itself  incompatible with the values of  a 
market society. Capitalism does not mean that all goods are traded on the market or that all 
values are best measured in money. The fact that people adhere to such things as loyalty, and 
so are not ready to sell their attachments to friends or spouses, clearly makes society better, 
and no more detracts from the advantages of  the markets in general than does the fact that 
bumping off  one’s competitors, even if  it could be very profitable on a company level, is 
barred by law – and the reason why it is so barred is not to enhance the overall GDP (though 
it may have this effect as well), but at least in part to enhance human dignity, which is not 
traded on the market, and the value of  which is not properly measured in monetary terms.1 
Indeed, there has been a growing sense among many economists that overall social welfare 
cannot be measured in financial terms alone, and that the traditional GDP measures should 
be revised to include such “non-financial” factors as happiness, clean environment, respect 
for human rights, etc.2
What is of  primary importance, however, and what puts impact investment in a dif-
ferent class of  phenomena than not having a price on one’s loyalty to friends or restricting 
the freedom of  market participants to bump off  their competitors, is the fact that impact in-
vesting, at least as I understand it here, goes beyond imposing external, political constraints 
on corporate behavior, or imposing personal (perhaps morally motivated) restrictions on the 
stocks in which one is prepared to invest. Instead, the impact investing with which I am pri-
marily concerned here focuses on influencing the internal decision making processes of  the 
companies in the investor’s portfolio and is designed to give positive support to certain kinds 
of  company actions, so that in weighing their social impact together with financial returns, 
the investor is in fact doing more than just potentially sacrificing a portion of  his own return 
in exchange for the satisfaction of  some other objectives. He is also intent on providing an 
incentive (perhaps, though not necessarily, a financial one) to company decision-makers to 
1 To be sure, if  a given value, such as personal loyalty, comes into conflict with some economic values—say, 
the efficiency of  a system of  justice involving compulsion to testify against one’s friends or spouses—
tradeoffs may in the end be necessary. Some believe that this amounts to “putting a price” on loyalty. I 
acknowledge the seriousness of  this problem, but do not deal with it here.
2 Perhaps the best known effort to redefine the measure of  societal well-being is the2008 report commis-
sioned by President Nicholas Sarkozy of  France and published as Report by the Commission on the Measurement of  
Economic Performance and Social Progress, http://www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/dossiers_web/stiglitz/
doc-commission/RAPPORT_anglais.pdf. To be sure, how the various components of  societal well-being are 
weighed against each other in any measure alternative to GDP is a big and controversial question.
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pursue the investor’s preferred social objectives—ones that the same decision-makers would 
not be otherwise pursuing (at least not to the same extent).
Now my main claim is that impact investors of  this kind are not really – or at least 
not “just” – investors. Insofar as they are not predicting that the market will move in their 
direction – but rather want to move the fiduciary corporate decision makers in the direction 
of  certain socially conscious decisions, even at a sacrifice of  financial return – they are in fact 
in a different kind of  business: that of  corporate lobbying, rather than investing.3 Like a takeover 
artist who invests in a company in order to put himself  in a position to influence managerial 
decisions, impact investors also want to use their money as a means to influence fiduciary 
corporate decision makers, but unlike most takeover artists, who just want to enhance the 
value of  their stock, they do it to maximize certain interests which the impact investor, but 
not the other investors in the same company, values above the market. Indeed, as I shall 
argue, an impact investor is “bribing” the corporate decision makers to use other investors’ 
money to foster the impact investor’s own preferred social objectives.
A few further words of  clarification are required, lest it be thought that I am propos-
ing some sort of  purist, perhaps “ideological,” theory of  investment. I do believe that buy-
ing stocks is not like buying cars: although consumers may have some affection for certain 
car colors, or even just for the “make” of  a car (the fact that it is produced by a certain com-
pany), stock investors (or creditors) are not usually satisfying personal “tastes” of  this kind; 
they are not maximizing preferences other than a desire for the highest financial returns, 
although it may well be very long-term returns. Indeed, stocks are not consumer goods at 
all, and buying them because one “likes” the company involved is like having a preference 
for two five-dollar bills over one ten-dollar bill because one prefers Lincoln to Hamilton.4
“Wait a minute!” a reader may exclaim at this point. Impact investors are not pursu-
ing their own private interests by putting pressure on company management; they are acting 
in the public interest, perhaps trying to prevent company management from making decisions 
that may generate some financial returns, but are socially harmful or unethical. Take, for 
example, a company like McDonald’s, whose purchasing policy supports breeders engag-
ing in inhuman and unethical treatment of  animals. What’s wrong with trying to persuade 
McDonald’s major investors to put pressure on the management to change their policies?5
3 I am making a distinction here between “corporate” and “political” lobbying because addressing corporate 
decision makers with demands to foster public goods has different, and potentially more serious, side effects 
than addressing the same kinds of  demands to political leaders.
4 I do not mean to deny, of  course, that shareholder loyalty, much as a customer’s, is not only not always 
irrational, but may in fact be very valuable to the company involved. This kind of  shareholder loyalty is not 
a “taste” for a particular company, however, but a form of  trust in its management’s honesty and ability, 
which may overcome, at least for a while, a less positive evaluation by the market. For a classic analysis of  
this subject, see A.O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Harvard U. Press, 1970).
5 I picked the McDonald’s example from Wayne Pacelle’s The Humane Economy: How Innovators and Enlightened 
Consumers Are Transforming the Lives of  Animals (Harper Collins, New York, 2016). Pacelle in fact tells the story 
of  enlisting the assistance of  one of  the most famous shareholder activists, Carl Icahn, to help influence 
McDonald’s management. Ibid.,pp. 33-38. In his May 2016 NYRB review of  Pacelle’s book, Peter Singer 
makes essentially the same argument as the one I cite in the text: “CEOs tend to listen to a billionaire activist 
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What’s wrong is that the management of  McDonald’s is not the right addressee of  
such ethical desiderata. To the extent that McDonald’s is about to make more money by be-
ing ethical, the management can be talked to in terms of  business matters, not ethics, and no 
“impact” investor is necessary to make the point that they should modify their purchasing 
policies. To the extent that McDonald’s (and thus its non-impact investors) is about to lose 
money on changing its policies, however, the impact investor should either address himself  
to the state and ask it to impose more humane policies on both McDonald’s and its competi-
tors (thus forcing the public to pay the higher price for the “ethical” meat), or appeal directly 
to the consumers to refuse to buy “unethically” produced hamburgers, which might create 
a standard, and perfectly legitimate, market pressure on McDonald’s to change its policies. 
But to buy the stock of  McDonald’s in order to lower its financial return and achieve other 
objectives is a potentially dangerous proposition.6
It is not simply a fact concerning human “tastes” that distinguishes investors from 
ordinary consumers. That investors in a company, unlike the consumers of  its products, have 
essentially identical interests is a very important systemic presupposition of  American corporate 
law; indeed, a basic assumption of  the American capitalist system in general. Without it, the 
collective action and agency problems of  a modern corporation would be much worse than 
they already are: the very interests of  corporate principals would likely be an aggregate of  
irreconcilable special objectives and, even if  a complex system of  aggregating their diverse 
preferences were available (which may not be the case), the principals would still have much 
greater difficulty monitoring the managers who are in control of  their company’s day-to-day 
decisions.
At bottom, we are dealing here with the traditional distinction between markets and 
other forms of  coordinating human behavior, involving all kinds of  organizations with vari-
ous governance mechanisms such as voting, hierarchies, etc. Indeed, the very institution of  a 
corporation is but a network of  contracts that replaces market transactions among a number 
of  individual input producers with an organizational structure, involving both voting and 
hierarchies, that endures across a large number of  transactions and results in a non-market 
investor with a history of  buying enough stock to get board seats and then make changes to management. 
Icahn had done that to make money for himself  and his investors. What was to prevent him doing it to 
reduce animal suffering?” The answer to Singer’s question is that in causing McDonald’s to reduce animal 
suffering, Icahn would not have been “making money for himself  and his investors.” What he would 
likely be doing would be causing other investors in McDonald’s (but also himself  and his investors) to lose 
their money. (I say “would” because Icahn, at least in Pacelle’s account, simply advised Pacelle to run for 
McDonald’s board and used his personal authority to facilitate contact with McDonald’s management, but 
did not in fact invest in the company to get a seat on the board, or another corporate governance position in 
order to change McDonald’s behavior.)
6 As noted already, I am not arguing primarily against people who don’t buy McDonald’s stock because 
they object to some aspects of  McDonald’s policies or activities. What concerns me is not simple 
avoidance of  associating oneself  with something of  which an investor may personally disapprove, but an 
investment strategy designed to effect a change in corporate policies through the exercise of  the power 
over management that the corporate governance system grants to shareholders. To be sure, the difference 
between such “negative” and “positive” impact investment may sometimes be hard to draw (as when a large-
scale boycott of  a company’s stock may lower of  the value of  its shares and effect a change in corporate 
decisions). 
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coordination of  individual behaviors. This allows the corporation to act as a single economic 
agent in the broader economic market. 
But precisely because of  this, in the absence of  special contractual arrangements, 
ownership of  a corporation is composed of  essentially undifferentiated shares of  all inves-
tors who constitute together one collective entity and, unless their interests are sufficiently 
aligned, face the classical “collective action” problems: since any corporate costs are shared 
identically among all the shareholders (in proportion to their investment), if  some principals 
value a certain benefit while others do not, a corporate pursuit of  that benefit will allow 
some principals to obtain it while imposing a part of  the cost on the others. This kind of  
free riding is a potentially serious problem that, unless overcome or seriously mitigated, 
threatens to undermine the effectiveness of  the corporate structure – especially in a world 
of  widely dispersed ownership.7
To be sure, corporations, and the legal-regulatory environment in which they oper-
ate, have developed all kinds of  mechanisms to deal with the collective action problems of  
corporate principals, and this is what much of  corporate governance is about. A whole host 
of  corporate charter provisions, as well as various mandatory disclosure rules, keep share-
holders informed about corporate matters, while voting rules and other governance mecha-
nisms offer them the means to influence corporate decisions. It may therefore be hoped that 
these mechanisms provide a consistent method of  aggregating the various objectives of  the 
principals, and avoid, or at least mitigate, most instances of  free-riding and other forms of  
exploitation.
It would be fatuous, however, to rely exclusively, or even predominantly, on the dis-
closure and voice-enabling aspects of  corporate governance to mitigate the possibility of  
the exploitation of  most shareholders in the world of  extremely dispersed corporate owner-
ship that is characteristic of  the U.S. economy. 
I set aside the somewhat academic problem of  the Arrow-theorem-type impossibili-
ty of  consistently aggregating the potentially extremely diverse preferences of  such a hetero-
geneous group as the shareholders of  an average American corporation, comprising people 
of  all classes, backgrounds, occupations, interests, political commitments, etc.8 But quite 
independently of  this, the majority of  American shareholders own a diversified portfolio, 
composed of  small stakes in many individual companies, and they are not expected to have 
an interest in devoting significant resources to direct participation in corporate governance. 
To be sure, it is possible to imagine some other arrangements giving the average small share-
holder an indirect or “virtual” representation, and not requiring an unreasonable investment 
of  time and energy that active involvement in corporate governance entails. Some form of  
delegation, such as the bank-managed trust accounts common in Germany, or some other 
method of  aligning small stakeholders’ interests with those of  a larger, more active investor, 
could perhaps mitigate some of  these problems. But the price to be paid for such a system 
is likely to be also high: above all, the resulting high ownership concentration, prevailing in 
7 For the classic analysis of  collective action problems, see M. Olson Jr., The Logic of  Collective Action. Public 
Goods and the Theory of  Groups (Harvard U. Press, 1965; 2nd revised edition, 1971).
8 Cf. K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (J. Wiley, 1951; 2nd ed., Yale U. Press, 1963).
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the environments in which shareholder activism is the norm, is likely to pose a significant 
obstacle to the maintenance of  a vibrant financial market.  Indeed, it is widely thought that 
this price is too high to make shareholder activism into a realistic option for most American 
corporations. The idea that the overwhelming majority of  shareholders are simply interested 
in maximizing financial returns on their investment, and do not have other seriously diversi-
fied interests that would have to be reconciled and aggregated on individual company level, 
is a very important presupposition of  American corporate governance, in the absence of  
which the whole financial-market-based corporate system might have to be rethought.
It could be said at this point that financial markets, just like product markets, provide 
a simple answer to most of  these collective action problems by substituting an investor’s 
exit option for the intricacies of  the exercise of  voice in an attempt to make corporate de-
cisions better suited to the buyer’s preferences. Just as I do not have to try change the way 
Ford builds its cars in order to maximize the satisfaction of  my preferences (because I can 
simply buy a car from GM or another firm that offers an alternative better suited to my 
tastes), every stock investor is also free not to buy the shares of  any particular company, or 
even to exit from any investment by selling his shares on the open market in order to make 
sure that his portfolio best matches his investment objectives. So, it may be said that impact 
investors who care about, say, the environment will invest in firms that include this among 
the objectives they pursue, even at the cost of  some financial returns, while purely financial 
investors will stay away from those companies, and invest in firms that cater to their finan-
cial objectives. True, financial markets may be somewhat less flexible than product markets 
because, while Ford can produce a number of  different car models in order to cater to a 
diversified body of  consumers, it is much harder (in fact, in most cases, not realistic) to pro-
duce different kinds of  equity stakes in the same company in order to cater to investors with 
qualitatively different investment objectives.9 But even if  each company is in fact offering 
only a single equity “product” on the market, companies can specialize, and the power of  
the market can perhaps be harnessed for the enhancement of  important social values and a 
greater achievement of  socially desirable objectives.
But the crucial corporate-governance role of  the financial markets in the American 
economic system is not limited to substituting exit for voice as a means by which a share-
holder signifies his or her disapproval of  corporate policies. Indeed, the most fundamental 
governance function of  the financial markets lies in their ability to lower radically the infor-
mation costs necessary for the shareholders to monitor corporate performance.
As long as the ownership and management are separated, as they are in most mod-
ern American corporations, monitoring the performance of  the management is probably 
the most serious problem of  corporate governance in general. Indeed, even in a corporation 
9 To the extent that it is possible to offer various kinds of  equity stakes, the differences in investment 
objectives that can be accommodated in this way are mostly limited to such things as risk or liquidity 
preferences of  different investors. Because of  the public-good nature of  most impact investment objectives, 
it is extremely unlikely that an ownership structure could be devised in which some investors, who are in part 
rewarded with, say, a cleaner environment, have to forego some monetary returns or other rewards of  their 
investment.
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with very concentrated ownership, in which there exists at least one shareholder whose stake 
is large enough to give him a sufficient incentive to monitor management performance, the 
“agency problem” of  a modern corporation does not cease to exist, because the main pur-
pose of  the separation of  ownership and control is to match the owners of  capital who lack 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills (or even a proper understanding of  what such skills 
consist of), with the people who have those skills, but are not wealthy enough to provide 
the capital necessary for deploying them to the optimal effect. The separation of  ownership 
and control thus allows the owners of  capital, who are interested in earning more than just 
interest on their money, to avail themselves of  the “upside” that may be gained from the 
special entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical skills for which the people who manage 
businesses are chosen through a specialized managerial labor market.
This matching of  capital and managerial skills is perhaps the greatest “secret” of  
a successful corporate system. The reason why it is a “secret” is because managerial skills, 
especially insofar as they entail what we think of  as innovation and entrepreneurship, are 
quintessentially “ineffable.”10 Like most important ways of  doing things, from knowing how 
to ski to being a great writer or painter, management is not a “science” that follows a set of  
prescribed rules. (Indeed, being a good scientist is itself  not a science.) To be sure, there are 
ski schools, writers’ workshops, and business schools. But if  all it took to be an Olympic 
skier was to follow faithfully the rules learned in ski school, the very idea of  the Olympics 
would make no sense. And what is true of  skiing is even more true of  entrepreneurial 
management. Indeed, the essence of  entrepreneurial skill is the ability to see that what the 
standard knowledge and wisdom prescribe is sometimes not the best way of  proceeding in 
a particular case, and the ability of  an entrepreneur to succeed is the most important (and 
the most “mysterious”) in those cases in which nearly everyone else sees only an excessive 
risk of  failure.
The very nature of  good (innovative and entrepreneurial) management is what 
makes it so hard to harness for the benefit of  investors. On the one hand, investors want 
to benefit from the mysterious skills possessed by the wizards of  the industry, but, on the 
other hand, precisely because those skills are in an important way “mysterious,” monitoring 
management has the features of  a paradox. If  you want ex ante to limit what the manage-
ment can do with your money, you will cripple its ability to do the very innovative things 
that are likely to appear ex ante unreasonable, but which might turn out later to have been 
the foundation of  superior returns. Also, because managerial decisions involve risks, many 
good managerial decisions may, even ex post, look wrong just because they did not pan out, 
although the risk taken had been in fact justified in the first place. So managerial discretion is 
the key if  you want to benefit from the skills that the manager has, but you don’t (and don’t 
10 The importance of  “ineffable knowledge” was stressed in M. Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (U. Chicago Press, 
1962).  But that management is an “art,” and not a “science,” had been stressed by F.H. Knight as early 
as 1923. See “Business Management: Science or Art?” Journal of  Business, State University of  Iowa, Vol. 4., 
reprinted in R.B. Emmet (ed.), Frank H. Knight in Iowa City, 1919-1928, Research in the History of  Economic 
Thought and Methodology, Volume 29-B (Emerald Group Publishers Ltd, 2-11), pp. 49-54.
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even fully understand). Still, if  you leave the management too much discretion, then how are 
you going to prevent not only bad business decisions, but also self-interested behavior that 
diverts corporate benefits to the managers in control?
This paradox of  management-performance monitoring affects even large or con-
trolling shareholders, who have all the incentives to expend enough time and resources to 
become informed about most corporate decisions. Even such shareholders are likely to stifle 
innovation and lower corporate returns, unless they leave the management enough discre-
tion to enable it to act against conventional wisdom. But unless the controlling investors find 
some way to curtail self-serving managerial behavior, they also risk, indeed probably assure, 
that the management will not faithfully serve their interests, sub-optimally perform, and not 
give the shareholders their due.11
The agency problem of  a firm without controlling shareholders or other large in-
vestors is even more serious, as the shareholders lack not only the skills, but also the incen-
tives, to learn about the technical details of  complex corporate decisions and to monitor 
the management in order to assure that it maximizes the interests of  the shareholders and 
does not divert corporate assets to other purposes. And it is here that well-functioning fi-
nancial markets solve the “mystery” of  the modern corporation: by focusing on the goal of  
maximizing financial returns, thus encapsulating all the best available knowledge about the 
quality and honesty of  the management into a single piece of  data – the stock price – they 
provide a uniquely simple, yet comprehensive and maximally accurate, measure of  corporate 
performance.
This, then, is my main corporate governance point: One of  the foundations of  capi-
talist success is the institution of  modern corporation which matches capital and entrepre-
neurial managerial skills with the help of  a governance arrangement that gives very extensive 
discretion to the management, while at the same time enabling even unsophisticated inves-
tors to monitor management performance by using a simple proxy of  the stock price, which 
provides a common denominator of  the extremely complex and heterogeneous managerial 
decisions that are otherwise very hard to monitor, even at a very high cost that most inves-
tors do not have the incentives or resources to commit.
But the corporate governance arrangement of  this kind crucially presupposes that 
price is indeed the common denominator of  all investors’ objectives, and that return maxi-
mization can be seen as the distinctive and unifying aim of  all shareholders. This is, of  
course, a strong assumption, affected with a certain degree of  normativity. What I mean 
by this is that shareholders, as actual individuals, may, as a matter of  fact, have all kinds of  
non-financial preferences with respect to desirable corporate behavior, and that markets 
may not be not be able to satisfy some of  them to the extent that various, perhaps even all, 
11 One may be tempted to argue at this point that the paradox of  monitoring managerial performance calls 
for a solution involving trust between the owners and the managers. I think that there is an element of  truth 
in this, and good business people have always insisted on the importance of  honesty and trust in commercial 
affairs. But trust alone is also very unlikely to provide a sufficient solution to the agency problems of  the 
modern corporation with a widely dispersed ownership by many mostly small investors. A systemic solution, 
assuring a high degree of  incentive compatibility, rather than appropriate socialization of  the actors involved, is 
therefore necessary to deal effectively with the agency problems in a modern economy.
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shareholders may like. To the extent that markets are not perfect, there may be many poten-
tially worthy (as well as nefarious) objectives of  this kind. But what I am arguing here is that 
while some such objectives may be properly pursued through the political system, the fact 
that the market does not price them correctly is the reason why their injection into the ordi-
nary mechanisms of  corporate governance amounts to “not playing by the rules.” In other 
words, when the simplicity of  the financial-return measure of  managerial performance is 
lost because of  the inclusion of  corporate aims that the market cannot properly price, the 
objective function of  the management contains a number of  heterogeneous components 
that are likely to be very hard, or even impossible, to aggregate. And once the management’s 
objective function is so complex, monitoring managerial performance becomes largely a fic-
tion. When a company’s product does not sell, for example, managers can still claim overall 
success because they caused the company to contribute to saving the environment, maintain 
a happy labor force, or serve various underprivileged communities. Once stock price is no 
longer the standard measure of  corporate performance, the difference between good and 
lousy management becomes muddied and agency problems become more serious. A fall in 
efficiency and a diversion of  corporate assets is likely to follow.
In this respect, impact investors, by advocating for a complex managerial objective 
function, are in the same boat as the proponents of  corporatist multi-constituency theories 
of  the corporation, who also contest the idea that the maximization of  shareholder-value, 
as expressed by the stock price, is the overriding purpose of  corporate management, and 
argue for the inclusion of  the interest of  the workers and the state (or the “public”) among 
the objectives to be pursued by the people in control. Indeed, state ownership is essentially 
in the same category as well, in that the struggle over the direction of  corporate decisions 
in firms with a sufficiently large state ownership is no longer decided by the market, but 
depends at least in part on a contest among various political preferences and considerations. 
It is a rather widely recognized fact that companies do not perform optimally under such 
conditions, and neither do economies in which they prevail. Is there any reason to believe 
that widespread “impact investing” would have a different effect?
To be sure, the proponents of  impact investments are not just another group of  cor-
poratists or socialist critics of  capitalism. Indeed, unlike the proponents of  state ownership 
or of  the corporatist multi-constituency basis of  the corporation, impact investors do not 
advocate a remaking of  the very foundations of  the capitalist market economy. In particu-
lar, they are not advocating a radical change in the very principles of  corporate governance 
characteristic of  the American capitalist society by an injection of  the state or other non-
shareholder groups into the corporate decision-making process.
Indeed, unlike many reformers of  the capitalist system, impact investors do not 
even propose to achieve their objectives by addressing themselves to the political system, 
and they do not advocate any external, political (legal and regulatory) constraints on the way 
the corporate market operates. This may seem strange, given that the objectives of  impact 
investment, be they clean environment, social justice, or fair labor relations, look very much 
like standard public goods that are suboptimally provided by the market and often require 
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state compulsion to overcome the free-riding that causes the market to fail. In fact, if  the 
goals of  impact investors are indeed public goods, then it is quite easy to see that they are 
addressing themselves to the wrong forum. Persuading economic agents to contribute vol-
untarily to the achievement of  such goods may play some role in certain situations, but it is, 
in most cases, roughly equivalent to arguing that refraining from polluting the air is a realistic 
alternative to coercive environmental regulation. So why would anyone do that instead of  
trying to persuade enough people to vote for regulation? 
On the other hand, to the extent that the goods pursued by impact investors may 
not be public goods, why would the same people not simply buy them on the market? It may 
look like that’s what impact investors are doing, and they may say that that’s what they are do-
ing, but that is not the case. If  you want some good that the market can supply in quantities 
corresponding to the demand—say, polio vaccinations for children in poor countries—the 
natural thing to do would be to set up foundations or NGOs devoted to buying the vaccines 
from the existing pharmaceutical companies (and perhaps assuring that they are properly 
distributed to the children in need). But buying the stock of  the same pharmaceutical com-
panies would make no sense, unless you believe that through your purchase you will gain 
enough influence on management decisions to pressure the companies to provide the vac-
cines for free (or at a steep discount) and spread the cost among all the shareholders.12 And 
once you are into bribing fiduciary decision-makers to pursue your own special interest at 
the expense of  others, you are not that different from those who exploit the weakness of  
the political system by bribing politicians to obtain what they cannot achieve through the 
market. 
But there is also another possibility that perhaps best embodies the special condi-
tion faced by many impact investors, and may help explain the attractiveness of  the idea. 
Consider a group of  people who advocate pursuing some genuine public good, but who 
want more of  it than they can persuade other people to pursue. In other words, consider a 
minority of  citizens who, either because they are more virtuous or because of  their idiosyn-
cratic valuations, want more of, say, clean environment than does the majority, which is nec-
essary for a collective political decision. Now this group is indeed facing an especially diffi-
cult situation because they seem unable to satisfy their preference either through the political 
system or through the market, at least not as long as they are playing by the rules of  these two 
institutions. A minority is clearly likely to lose in the political arena, unless it finds a way to 
block the ordinary majoritarian way in which the political decisions are usually made – this is 
the classic “special interest” situation that most impact investors disdain: they would rather 
pay for what they want than try to lobby and bribe their way around the normal political 
procedure. But the problem that the impact investment minority faces is that because of  the 
peculiar public nature of  the good they are trying to obtain, they are also likely to be unable 
12 To be sure, if  you think you could run an existing pharmaceutical company better than its present 
management, it might make sense to buy a controlling stake and effect a takeover (or start a new company 
on your own). But unless you intend to force the rest of  the shareholders into paying for something that they 
don’t want to pay for, it is hardly an instance of  impact investment. As long as the other shareholders are not 
losing money, you are simply another (though more active) investor.
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to buy it on the market, even if  they are willing to pay its “fair” price. Continuing with our 
example, the environmentally-minded minority wants an excess of  clean environment over 
what other people demand. While the market alone may not produce enough clean environ-
ment for anyone, the quantity demanded by most people can be relatively easily obtained 
through the political system. But the majority will not vote to pay for the excess desired by 
the minority, and even if  the minority wants to pay for it, the majority may react by decreas-
ing their willingness to pay for the same good because they can free-ride on the voluntary 
contributions of  the minority. So the minority in question is indeed a peculiar special inter-
est. They want something that they believe is good for everyone, but others are not willing to 
pay for enough of  it, and when the minority wants to pay for the excess by itself, it will not 
get it either because the majority will now reduce their effective demand, so as to keep the 
amount of  the good in question at the lower level that would have been provided anyway.
Not an enviable situation to find oneself  in. And it may very well be the peculiar 
difficulty of  their position that makes impact investors pursue their objectives by exploiting 
the weaknesses and failures of  the market itself.  The particular weakness that gives impact 
investment some chance of  success is, as I argued, the relatively fragile governance struc-
ture of  the modern corporation, designed to solve the agency and monitoring problems of  
the widely dispersed shareholders, but only so long as the shareholders are a homogeneous 
group intent on maximizing financial returns. It is this fragility that the impact investment 
movement is trying to exploit by proposing that investors consider non-financial objectives 
of  the companies in which they invest and impose a more complex objective function on the 
management in control of  most corporate decisions. This may not appear as reprehensible 
as bribing politicians to devote public funds to foster your own special interest. But as I ar-
gued, the price of  this move is also potentially very steep: it weakens the capitalist economic 
system and undermines one of  its most sophisticated institutional achievements.
